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The Crisis of German Social Democracy
Revisited
J €ORG MICHAEL DOSTAL
Abstract
This article analyses the dramatic electoral decline of German social democracy since 2003. It
argues that the SPD’s decision, under the leadership of former Chancellor Gerhard Schr€oder,
to engage in welfare state retrenchment and labour market deregulation during the ‘Hartz
reforms’ (2003–05) demoralised the SPD electorate. The SPD subsequently lost half of its for-
mer electoral coalition, namely blue-collar voters and socially disadvantaged groups, while
efforts to gain access to centrist and middle-class voters have failed to produce any compen-
sating gains. While the SPD’s decline from a large to a mid-sized party is part of a larger
transformation of the German party system, no political recovery is possible for social
democracy without a fundamental change of strategy, namely efforts to regain former voters
by offering credible social welfare and redistributive policies. The SPD will not be able to
delegate such policies in a ‘convoy model’ to other parties, such as the Left Party; nor will a
modest ‘correction’ of the earlier course, such as has been attempted since 2009 under the
leadership of current party chairman Sigmar Gabriel, be sufﬁcient to recover lost electoral
ground.
Keywords: German party system, German politics, Hartz reforms, Left Party, SPD
Introduction
CONTINENTAL EUROPEAN social democracy has
not fared well in the twenty-ﬁrst century.
Wherever social democratic parties used to
be signiﬁcant actors in national party sys-
tems, they have either nearly disappeared—
such as in Greece—or have faced dramatic
electoral decline. In the past ﬁfteen years,
this has particularly been the case for social
democrats in Germany (SPD), France (PS)
and Spain (PSOE), to name only the major
west European cases. In each of those three
cases—and similar developments apply in
smaller continental European countries, such
as Austria (SP€O)—the electoral decline had a
clear starting point, namely the explicit
endorsement of neoliberal supply-side
reform by social democratic party leaders.
The ﬁrst mover in this respect was Ger-
man Chancellor Gerhard Schr€oder’s supply-
side reforms of the German labour market,
which began in 2003. These are known as
the ‘Hartz reforms’, named after a then
human resources manager at Volkswagen
who acted as Schr€oder’s assistant in setting
the agenda, although the SPD soon renamed
the programme ‘Agenda 2010’. The Hartz
and Agenda reforms turned out to amount
to a general remodelling of German
capitalism post-uniﬁcation. These reforms
symbolised the transition from an earlier
neo-corporatist to a new supply-side-
oriented form of labour market governance
in Germany.1 Even more importantly, they
stood for a philosophical and normative shift
in the attitudes of leading social democratic
policy-makers, away from a welfare state
based on collective risk sharing of wage
earners in the social insurance system
toward a new ethic based on burden-shifting
from welfare-state institutions to individual
employees and private households.2
In particular, the Hartz and Agenda poli-
cies expanded non-regular forms of employ-
ment, such as ﬁxed-term and agency
employment with lower standards of social
protection, and introduced large-scale cuts in
welfare and social insurance entitlements.
Around the time of the Hartz reforms, there
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were also cuts in pension levels in the public
pension system in favour of newly estab-
lished individual private insurance on a vol-
untary basis (the so-called ‘Riester-Rente’).
All these reforms amounted to the most
dramatic retrenchment of employment stan-
dards and social policies in the history of the
Federal Republic. A newly introduced wel-
fare beneﬁt of last resort—the so-called
‘Hartz 4’ system, designed to exclude the
long-term unemployed and other disadvan-
taged groups from the scope of social insur-
ance—became a notorious symbol of the
new order. The new policy triggered the lar-
gest ever street protest movement in the his-
tory of the uniﬁed Germany when millions
of people participated over the course of
months, and in some cases years, in street
rallies against the Hartz reforms.
The outcome of this extra-parliamentary
mobilisation (the so-called ‘anti-Hartz move-
ment’) might be summarised as follows: (1)
the alliance between the SPD and the trade
unions broke down and the latter mobilised,
for the ﬁrst time in their history, on a broad
scale against SPD policies; (2) the Hartz
reforms produced a split inside the SPD, and
a leftist faction resigned from the party to
join forces with the predominantly East Ger-
man Party of Democratic Socialism to form
the Left Party, which subsequently became
an established ﬁxture in the German party
system; (3) the SPD suffered the largest elec-
toral decline in the party’s history.
In brief, the 2003–05 policies of the
Schr€oder SPD attacked their own electorate,
especially working-class constituencies in
declining economic sectors and socially dis-
advantaged groups. They broke the social
contract to defend high standards of employ-
ment rights and welfare entitlements for core
workers that had underpinned the long-
standing alliance between the SPD and the
trade unions and had largely become the
norm in West Germany since the 1960s.
While various disadvantaged groups and the
less established sectors of the working class
had never been fully represented by the SPD
—a party traditionally dominated by skilled
workers, the Facharbeiter, and later, since the
1970s, by civil servants and sections of the
new middle class—they had nevertheless
usually joined forces with the skilled sectors
of the labour movement at the ballot box by
voting SPD, since voting for the conservative
parties did not normally provide a promis-
ing alternative.
For the SPD, the political cost of the Hartz
and Agenda policies has been very high: the
party has lost around half of the electoral
support it was previously able to claim. The
electoral downturn began between 2003 and
2005 when the reforms were announced and
implemented, and continued in the federal
elections of 2009 and 2013. The electoral
decline has not reversed since then, and the
SPD is no longer able to compete with the
centre-right Christian Democrats (the CDU/
CSU) on an equal basis.3 In post-Hartz Ger-
man politics, the SPD has lost its earlier sta-
tus of Volkspartei, the German term to
indicate a catch-all and potential majority
party representing a large segment of the
electorate. Instead, in many areas the SPD
now holds the status of a mid-sized or even
small party, such as in the regions (L€ander)
of Baden-W€urttemberg, Th€uringen and Sach-
sen, where the most recent electoral results,
between 2014 and 2016, gave it only between
12.4 and 12.7 per cent of the vote. In these
three L€ander the SPD ﬁnished only as the
third or fourth largest party, in an increas-
ingly diverse party system in which it is fre-
quently overtaken by the Left Party, the
Greens and the right-wing Alternative for
Germany (AfD), as well as the Christian
Democrats.
This article sets out to explain the electoral
decline of the SPD since 2003. First, the politi-
cal background of the Hartz reforms and the
SPD’s leadership role in this context is brieﬂy
outlined. Then, three major issues will be
covered: (1) people and ideas; (2) policies
and institutions; and (3) the future role of the
SPD in the changing German party system.
Germany: from neo-corporatism to
the Hartz reforms
Before the Hartz reforms, the German model
of capitalism (the Modell Deutschland) was
largely based on neo-corporatist structures.
Labour and social policy-making was farmed
out from the political system in the narrow
sense to social partners, namely employer
associations and trade unions. In addition,
there existed a dense network of civil society
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associations, churches, welfare-providing
associations and other long-standing interest
groups. These institutions, some with roots
in the traditional workers’ movement and
others in Christian social teaching, provided
a training ground for the personnel of
Germany’s main political parties.
The governance of the system was based
on tripartite-style coordination, i.e. joint gov-
ernance by state ofﬁcials, employer represen-
tatives and unions that extended to various
institutions such as unemployment insur-
ance, vocational training systems and labour
market governance. As for Parliament, the
Labour and Social Affairs Committee and
the party specialists associating there were
socialised to accept this system as the natural
way of doing business.
Following German uniﬁcation, there were
efforts to extend the West German neo-cor-
poratist system to the East. However, the nec-
essary institutional preconditions were absent
and social upheaval in East Germany, com-
bined with extremely high unemployment
levels, meant that the system of the west was
transferred in name only. In the mid-1990s, it
became clear that the East German labour
market would largely remain outside the
scope of employer associations and unions,
since deindustrialisation produced a frag-
mented employment system without large
employers or a strong union presence.
Furthermore, since the German social
insurance system is largely ﬁnanced by
levies on employers and employees, the drop
in revenue due to high unemployment post-
uniﬁcation led many German economists to
argue that these levies (Lohnnebenkosten)
were too high, thereby undermining German
competitiveness and employment levels. The
existing system of labour market governance
rather than the economic shock of uniﬁcation
was blamed for the crisis. Paradoxically, it
was only after the 1998 change in govern-
ment from the centre-right (CDU/CSU and
liberals) to the centre-left (SPD and Greens)
that policy-making started to shift in line
with the prescriptions of neoliberal
economists.
The change in government in 1998 and the
narrow re-election of the SPD and Green
government in 2002 took place in the context
of generational change in all political parties.
The ‘welfare state generation’ of CDU/CSU
and SPD politicians that had dominated the
system since the 1970s, and that had deep
roots in welfare-state associations, unions
and the public sector, retired from politics.
The new generation of politicians, in both
the CDU/CSU and the SPD, had by contrast
advanced either along the path of party-poli-
tical careers or had general professional
backgrounds rather than an interest in social
policy.4
In the SPD, the power struggle between
Gerhard Schr€oder as Chancellor and Oskar
Lafontaine as SPD chairman and, brieﬂy,
economics minister (between 1998 and 1999)
resulted in the latter’s resignation from
ofﬁce. This signalled the defeat of the leftists
in the SPD and opened the gates for a new
group of SPD politicians directly connected
with Schr€oder to enter inﬂuential positions
in party and government. These newcomers
were no longer connected with traditional
labour and social policy interests, and their
career advancement depended solely on
serving the party leadership.
The SPD in transition: 1998 and
2002
In SPD circles, debate about supply-side
reform in the labour market was largely
avoided between 1998 and 2002. The only
high-proﬁle attempt to raise ‘ideological’
issues—the so-called ‘Schr€oder–Blair paper’
of June 1999, jointly written by Bodo Hom-
bach, then head of Schr€oder’s chancellery,
and Peter Mandelson, at that point a back-
bench MP but still close to the Blair leader-
ship—called for a ‘supply-side oriented
agenda’, ‘ﬂexible goods, capital and labour
markets’ and ‘necessary cuts in public
spending’. The paper triggered a brief but
angry reaction within the SPD and the possi-
bility of further discussion was quickly
dropped. Until the 2002 federal election,
Schr€oder and the SPD appeared to be uni-
ﬁed in efforts to keep labour-market issues
off the agenda in order to ﬁght elections
against an increasingly neoliberal CDU/CSU
opposition, which demanded large-scale
retrenchment of welfare-state institutions.
Shortly before the 2002 federal elections,
Chancellor Schr€oder outsourced further
reform debate to the Hartz Commission (on
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labour market reform) and, shortly after the
election, to the R€urup Commission (on pen-
sion reform). Both commissions were ad hoc
bodies without any clear status and were
appointed at the Chancellor’s pleasure. The
commissions were dominated by representa-
tives of private corporations and served the
purpose of setting policy agendas that could
be pushed through the federal parliament
and the second chamber of the regions (Bun-
desrat) without further debate. However, the
CDU/CSU held the majority in the second
chamber, a potential veto point in Ger-
many’s multilevel governance. Thus, the
reform agenda required the opposition’s sup-
port, which was forthcoming in due course
and helped Schr€oder to present his policies
as a foregone conclusion to his own party.
Following the 2002 federal elections that
were narrowly won by the SPD and Greens,
Schr€oder announced the Hartz reforms for
implementation on a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ basis
in a speech to the federal parliament on 14
March 2003. He demanded that his party fol-
low his course and was supported in this
imposition by a small group of assistants
that became known as the SPD’s ‘Agenda
wing’. This dramatic shift toward supply-
side policies clearly shocked the SPD’s rank-
and-ﬁle and amounted to ‘policy-seeking’ at
the expense of ‘vote-seeking’. Following
Schr€oder’s announcements in Parliament, the
SPD suffered dramatic electoral declines in
every subsequent election and at each level
of the German federal system. In parallel,
SPD membership ﬁgures dropped and the
leftist SPD wing resigned to join forces with
the PDS to form the new Left Party. After
the SPD’s dramatic electoral defeat in its for-
mer stronghold of North-Rhine Westphalia
in 2005, Schr€oder decided to seek a new
mandate for his policies. He called for early
federal elections and lost narrowly to Angela
Merkel’s CDU, at which point he retired
from politics.
From the point of view of the SPD, the
main concern was that the party received the
lion’s share of the electoral punishment for
the unpopular labour market deregulation
and welfare retrenchment policies. The
CDU/CSU fared comparatively better, since
its electoral base was economically more
secure and less dependent on welfare state
policies. Some SPD politicians subsequently
tried to blame the CDU/CSU for imposing
more drastic cuts in social protection in the
process of negotiating over Hartz and
subsequent reform packages in the second
chamber of parliament, but this strategy of
blame-shifting failed to work: the German
public held Chancellor Schr€oder, rather than
the opposition leader Angela Merkel, politi-
cally responsible. The SPD suffered what
could only be described as a breakdown of
its electoral base, and the number of SPD
voters declined from 20 million in 1998 to
less than 10 million in 2009.
People and ideas in the SPD
At the level of party personnel, the SPD
proved unable to react to negative electoral
feedback about Agenda policies. One symbol
of this was the party’s failure to ﬁnd new
leaders with new ideas. Thus, when
Schr€oder resigned from his position as SPD
chairman in 2004 due to his unpopularity
with the membership, the party elite fol-
lowed his suggestion to appoint as his suc-
cessor Franz M€untefering, a person who had
served as Schr€oder’s right-hand man and
who symbolised the party’s ‘Agenda wing’.
After losing the 2005 federal elections and
joining the new Chancellor Angela Merkel in
a grand coalition government as a junior
partner, the SPD went through three other
party chairmen in quick succession, brieﬂy
reappointing M€untefering between 2008 and
2009.
Only after the even more crushing federal
election defeat of 2009 did the SPD appoint
Sigmar Gabriel, one of the very few promi-
nent SPD politicians who had kept some dis-
tance from the Agenda policies, as its new
chairman. Yet this belated change of course
occurred only when most of the representa-
tives of the ‘Agenda wing’ in the SPD had in
turn decided to resign from politics. Thus,
the new SPD leadership, still in place today,
reached their positions due to the exhaustion
of the ‘Agenda wing’ rather than any open
political challenge of the earlier course.
As for political ideas, one might stress that
the SPD had faced, for the entire period
between 1998 and 2009, a strategic dilemma.
On the one hand, Germany had been
increasingly inﬂuenced by neoliberal ideas
since the 1990s and the SPD had already lost
conﬁdence in national neo-Keynesian policies
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before 1998.5 Yet this transition at the level
of economic doctrine had never been made
fully explicit and was not matched by
changes in electoral strategy. In the past, the
SPD had always claimed that the party
would guarantee high levels of social protec-
tion to core workers as a reward for good
performance in the workplace. Yet the
‘Agenda wing’ of the SPD no longer offered
such assurances: under the Schr€oder and
M€untefering leaderships, the party
announced that retrenchment was the only
way to restore German economic competi-
tiveness and that workers were simply
expected to pay the necessary price through
cuts to their living standards, social security
and future pensions.
Moreover, the retrenchment of welfare
guarantees, especially the limitation of
unemployment insurance payments to a sin-
gle year, followed by the demand on the
unemployed to use up their personal savings
(and those of their partners) before qualify-
ing for any further means-tested welfare
payments, suggested an expansion of the
zone of economic precariousness. Post-
reform, losing one’s job once again became
an existential challenge to one’s social status:
no matter how long and how much people
had paid into the social insurance system,
they no longer received reliable levels of pro-
tection. Thus, by devaluing the explicit and
implicit promises of the German welfare
state and by increasing pressure on the
unemployed to accept any kind of employ-
ment regardless of pay and conditions, the
new policies became a very strong device to
restore ‘discipline’ in the labour market.
Yet by attacking its own core electoral
support group, the SPD destroyed the basis
of its past electoral success and created a
general feeling of demoralisation among the
rank-and-ﬁle. In 2009, former SPD voters left
in virtually all directions, especially toward
non-voting, the Left Party and the Greens (in
that order). However, a sizable cohort also
turned away from the centre-left electoral
camp and moved to the right—initially to
the CDU/CSU and the Liberals, but more
recently, since 2013, to the new AfD party.
Thus, the conventional wisdom suggesting
that elections are won in the centre proved
to be true only as long as the leftist elec-
torate and the traditional working-class
groups—two different but signiﬁcant compo-
nents of the SPD’s former electoral coalition
—were not completely abandoned. This was
patently not the case after 2003.
To be fair, the SPD made efforts to regain
its former electorate after the poor results in
the federal elections of 2009 and 2013. First,
the party committed itself to a policy of ‘cor-
rections’ of the earlier Hartz policies. In par-
ticular, the SPD agreed with an increasingly
centrist CDU/CSU, which in turn had
become less keen on neoliberalism due to
the post-2008 crisis, to once again improve
conditions in the unemployment insurance
system for those who held long-term contri-
bution records. In addition, the SPD put for-
ward new welfare policies to make it easier
for women to participate in full-time
employment by improving state-supported
childcare policies. More recently, and in reac-
tion to the European Central Bank’s low
interest-rate policies that have triggered a
rapid rise in asset prices in the German real
estate sector and the stock market—a devel-
opment that will not surprise an Anglo-
American readership—the SPD has also tried
to reposition itself as the party defending the
interests of people living in rented housing.
In addition, the party tried to gain a de
facto feminist proﬁle, although such efforts
often triggered new misunderstandings. For
example, the current SPD justice minister
Heiko Maas suggested that divorced fathers
who failed to pay child maintenance to their
former partners should have their driving
licences revoked. To many observers, such
policies appeared as authoritarian and as a
sure way to make divorced men become
unemployable, meaning the punishment
would make them even less likely to be able
to pay child maintenance.6
More recently, the SPD chairman and cur-
rent German Vice Chancellor Gabriel reacted
to the refugee crisis and the increased num-
ber of migrants entering Germany in 2015
with demands to expand welfare policies for
the native population in order to increase
the public’s willingness to pay for the social
integration of newcomers.7 While correctly
pointing out that Chancellor Angela Merkel’s
optimistic statement of 31 August 2015 that
‘We can manage’ with regard to the refugee
crisis has largely not been borne out by real-
ity on the ground, he failed to clarify how
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the SPD’s own earlier welfare retrenchment
could be reconciled with his new demands.
To be sure, the SPD leadership has merely
been trying to appeal to different wings of
the party’s remaining electorate, including
those sections that are critical of the high
numbers of admitted refugees. Yet the idea
that the situation demanded additional wel-
fare rights for Germans was clearly some-
thing that the SPD had not been advocating
before the 2015 refugee crisis, and the elec-
torate could not help but notice. Thus, the
move appeared opportunistic, at a moment
in which the rightist AfD was quickly
expanding its electoral appeal based on an
anti-immigration platform.
Looking at the larger picture, the main
problem of the SPD’s new ‘generosity’ with
regard to welfare policies—albeit with an
authoritarian bent and closely related to the
project of making full-time employment the
only socially acceptable way of life—is that
they lack credibility with voters and fail to
address underlying structural problems. For
example, promises to limit rent increases at a
time when rent levels have been growing far
above the ofﬁcial rate of inﬂation for a
number of years ring empty. What all of the
new employment-oriented welfare policies
fail to address is the increased feeling of
insecurity among the working public in gen-
eral, which is directly due to the past poli-
cies of the SPD.
In conclusion, the SPD policies during the
Hartz years from 2003 to 2005, the transition
period away from these policies up to 2009
and the efforts taken since then to partially
correct the previous course all failed in terms
of delivering electoral support for the party.
On the one hand, the traditional employee
groups in declining economic sectors, histori-
cally associated with the SPD and the
unions, turned away from the SPD toward
non-voting, or switched to the Left Party.
What remained of the SPD’s support came
to be concentrated among white-collar
employees, civil servants and pensioners. On
the other hand, those who won as a result of
the structural economic changes did not sup-
port the SPD either. Instead, they voted for
the centre-right parties setting out low tax
policies, or supported the Greens as the
party catering for an ecologically conscious
and self-reﬂexive new bourgeois milieu that
exists mostly at a safe distance from large
private sector employers and unions. The
SPD’s change of course was not appreciated
by the electorate.
Policies and institutions: the new
role of the SPD
It is rather tempting to search for some lar-
ger meaning in the SPD’s general failure to
successfully contest elections over the past
ﬁfteen years or so. Could it be that there is
some larger structural change at work that
explains the party’s behaviour, at least to
some extent? Undeniably, one major possi-
bility is structural change in the German
employment regime. Such change might
have motivated the SPD leaders to make an
effort to appeal to upwardly mobile social
groups (the ‘winners’) at the expense of
delinking from declining sectors (the
‘losers’).
In this context, one signiﬁcant shift in the
German labour market is seen in the ten-
dency for younger employees to hold higher
educational qualiﬁcations compared to the
older generation. Optimistic observers of this
development suggest a ‘competency revolu-
tion’—increased autonomy and control in
the workplace—while pessimists highlight
that increased educational credentials do not
necessarily mean better job prospects or
improved social positions, but could also
point to the emergence of a ‘colourful service
proletariat’.8
Back in 1991, a large percentage of
employees in Germany held vocational train-
ing credentials (46 per cent), but by 2013 this
ﬁgure stood at 29 per cent. In parallel, the
share of employees with academic and semi-
academic credentials grew from 32 per cent
(1991) to 47 per cent (2013). The number of
workers without formal qualiﬁcations or
with limited ‘on-the-job’ training has
remained largely stagnant, standing at 22
per cent in 1991 and 24 per cent in 2013.9
Thus, the centre ground of the German
labour market is today deﬁned by (semi-)
professionals, while traditional groups of the
working class have become to some extent
marginalised.
Yet such structural change does not
remove social insecurity: the ‘new’ groups
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often fail to earn more than their parents.
Real wages in Germany fell or stagnated
from the mid-1990s until very recently, while
they grew in most other EU countries up to
the 2008 crisis. Many of the newly created
jobs are in deregulated sectors, based on
ﬁxed-term contracts and precarious social
security. In particular, an increasing number
of jobs are not covered by social insurance
and are therefore considered ‘non-standard’
employment in the German context (the
McJob equivalent of Anglo-American capital-
ism). The share of standard employment
declined from 79 per cent in 1991 to 68 per
cent in 2014, while in 2014 the share of
‘atypical employees’ (i.e. those in ﬁxed-term,
agency or ‘short hour’ jobs) amounted to 21
per cent. Among the self-employed (11 per
cent), more than half are solo-self-employed,
meaning they are particularly exposed to
changes in their individual circumstances.10
However one interprets such structural
employment changes, it would be wrong to
claim that employees have generally lost
interest in collective risk-sharing and welfare
state policies. Rather than pointing to
increased ‘self-responsibility’ as a solution to
new social risks, as did the Schr€oder SPD,
the challenge is to reinvent social protection
for a new generation. However, neither the
SPD nor the other European social demo-
cratic parties have managed to develop such
new policies. During the Schr€oder years up
to 2005, and during the years of ‘Agenda
wing’ dominance up to 2009, the SPD was at
the forefront in pushing risk toward individ-
ual employees.11
This course never gained support among
trade unions, with the exception of two
individual trade union leaders representing
the chemical and railway workers’ unions,
who were personally close to Schr€oder
and subsequently received lucrative posi-
tions on company boards. This episode
triggered much resentment among the
rank-and-ﬁle and both union leaders
subsequently left the scene in 2009. In
general, unions have been united in
demanding re-regulation of the labour
market and a renewal of the welfare state.
Thus, the SPD’s ‘Agenda wing’ simply did
not exist in union circles.
From the unions’ perspective, the German
employment system suffers from
deregulation, permanent austerity in the
public sector and creeping privatisation. In
this context, the decline of traditional
employment sectors is pointed to by long-
term reductions in the coverage rate of col-
lective wage agreements between unions and
employers. Only around half of all employ-
ees are still covered by collective agreements,
and union membership has fallen below the
20 per cent mark. There has also been a large
degree of privatisation in the communica-
tion, transport and health sectors which usu-
ally brings with it a signiﬁcant deterioration
in the terms and conditions of employees in
the affected sectors.
On the other hand, some public services
have also been expanded, especially with
regard to childcare and health services for
senior citizens. Most employees in these sec-
tors are female, and their work is often treated
as ‘unqualiﬁed’ and is poorly paid. The service
workers’ union, Verdi (now the second largest
German union by membership), has sup-
ported strike action by nursery teachers to
improve their pay and conditions. However,
municipal employers in the public sector are
consistently unwilling to increase wages. The
municipalities argue that they are under pres-
sure to balance their budgets. Budget balance
has in some cases been written into regional
constitutions (for example in the state of
Hesse). Such developments point to increasing
divisions in the socio-economic positions of
employees in different sectors, such as
between those in booming export industries
and those employed in public services suffer-
ing from state-imposed austerity.
Electoral strategy: three choices
for the SPD
No matter how one interprets the structural
changes in the labour market, it is not con-
vincing to claim that such changes ‘overde-
termine’ the electoral strategy of the SPD.
Rather, the party continues to have different
options and can exercise choices—con-
sciously or unconsciously. The traditional
strategy used to be to bring the interests of
different sectors of employees and of ‘win-
ners’ and ‘losers’ into some sort of equilib-
rium in order to maximise electoral appeal.
This ‘coalition of employees’ approach used
236 J €OR G M I C H A E L DO S T A L
The Political Quarterly, Vol. 88, No. 2 © The Author 2016. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2016
to be the SPD’s line, before the Schr€oder
years.
A second strategy is to appeal primarily to
the winners of structural change in the labour
market, repositioning the SPD as the represen-
tative of middle-class employees with high
aspirations. In this case, the party must com-
pete with the centre-right to strike a new bal-
ance focusing on cuts in welfare state
provisions and support for ‘self-responsibil-
ity’ and ‘entrepreneurship’. This approach
was certainly favoured by the ‘Agenda wing’,
which targeted all electoral efforts at what
SPD leaders back then referred to as the ‘new
centre of employees’. However, this second
strategy, at play during the 2005 and 2009
SPD federal election campaigns, suffered from
two signiﬁcant disadvantages, namely that
the SPD voluntarily vacated its earlier claim
to represent solidarity and social justice and,
by trying to copy a competing party—namely
the CDU/CSU—focused all efforts on centrist
voters that were already targeted by a credi-
ble competitor.
Finally, a potential third strategy could be
to appeal mostly to the ‘losers’ of structural
change, to strengthen the focus on solidarity
and egalitarianism and to renew the SPD’s
earlier alliance with the trade unions. How-
ever, this third strategy has never been seri-
ously contemplated due to party leaders’
conviction that the victims of structural eco-
nomic change are those least likely to vote in
elections, and therefore least promising in
terms of an electoral strategy.
What makes the choice of electoral strat-
egy more complicated for the SPD is that the
different socio-economic target groups are
also internally divided in terms of their nor-
mative orientation. While some favour soli-
daristic and egalitarian policies, others might
demand authoritarian and/or paternalistic
ones. To be sure, this conﬂict is too often
presented as a simple dichotomy between
libertarian and authoritarian values. The
new middle classes are claimed to be close
to the former pole, while the economically
disadvantaged are held to be open to right-
wing populist demands. However, one
should appreciate that the voters of the SPD
might hold different values and attitudes in
different contexts. Crucially, authoritarian
values and the exclusionary logic of ‘compe-
tition’—which suggests punishment of
‘losers’—have been part and parcel of the
‘new’ SPD, and emerged ﬁrst and foremost
in the context of neoliberal ‘modernisation’.
Thus, abandoning the ‘losers’ of socio-
economic change, as was the case during the
Schr€oder years, is a form of authoritarianism,
and the removal of social protection does
not just impose electoral costs. This kind of
SPD authoritarianism—a feature of
Schr€oder’s arriviste style and that of his suc-
cessor M€untefering, who preached labour
discipline and frugality during his time as
SPD Vice Chancellor to Angela Merkel and
as labour minister between 2005 and 2009—
had an element of farce: it refused to make
explicit that the SPD had shifted its ideologi-
cal investment towards ‘competitiveness’ at
the level of society and the individual. In
short, by ‘announcing to the social state-
rooted milieus that the process of modern-
ization was not expected to be backed up by
the welfare state or the protection of
achieved social status, neither regarding
working life nor with concern to old age and
pensions’, the SPD leadership voluntarily cut
its links with disadvantaged groups.12
Such a strategic shift meant that the ‘idea
of oppression, a structural polarity between
rulers and ruled, disappeared from the
discourse of the ofﬁcial left’ and was
‘replaced by the neutralizing notion of the
“social contract”’.13 Moreover, to invoke the
‘autonomous subject’ meant ‘in the name of
an apparently necessary “individualization”
. . . legitimizing the retrenchment of labour
laws, of social security systems and generally
of the mechanisms of societal solidarity and
redistribution’.14
If one considers the three scenarios out-
lined above, the SPD’s electoral approach in
the twenty-ﬁrst century has been to follow
the second strategy (i.e. to appeal to the win-
ners of modernisation). In short, the SPD
‘does no longer aspire to be a left people’s
party (Volkspartei) of the middle and lower
social layers’ but intends to be a ‘party of the
new centre focusing its concern on resource-
strong employees with educational aspira-
tions’. This implies that the party ‘is no longer
able to integrate the lower ﬁfth of society’.15
The problem with this strategy, of course,
is that it has never worked. The leadership’s
turn away from the party’s core electorate
did not produce any sizable gains elsewhere.
T H E C R I S I S O F G E RMAN SO C I A L D EMO C R A C Y R E V I S I T E D 237
© The Author 2016. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2016 The Political Quarterly, Vol. 88, No. 2
The exclusive focus on the centre ground,
already subject to the offerings of all elec-
toral competitors with the exception of the
Left Party, helped to reinforce neoliberal val-
ues. Those failing to adapt to new times and
a lean welfare state were considered to be
social failures in need of sanctions and pun-
ishment. In addition, they could safely be
ignored when ﬁghting elections.
Thus, the SPD’s shift to the centre ground
appeared as a surrender of earlier solidaristic
values and prepared the ground for some of
the party’s electorate to consider turning
even further to the right. After all, if the SPD
accepted ideas that had in the past been
antagonistic to its core values, namely ‘dis-
courses of just inequality [i.e. those based on
meritocracy], a lean state, focus on self-
responsibility, or the apparent contradiction
between old and modern social democracy’,
their relative difference to the political offer-
ings of the right wing appeared to become
less signiﬁcant.16 The ideology of everyday
life pushed for by the SPD during the wel-
fare retrenchment years stressed that ‘there
is not enough for everyone’, which prepared
the ground for the demoralisation of the
SPD’s traditional core supporters. The latent
fear of downward social mobility in Ger-
many is widespread and was reawakened
and radicalised by the external challenge of
the 2015 refugee crisis, pointing to the fact
that the country is, after more than a decade
of austerity and retrenchment, poorly pre-
pared to integrate newcomers.
Conclusion: what new role for the
SPD in a transformed party
system?
Three points require further clariﬁcation.
First, how does the changed role of the SPD
relate to the broader transformation of the
German party system? Second, how does the
SPD relate to projects offering a left-of-centre
alternative to Merkel’s centre-right CDU/
CSU? Finally, is there any conceivable strat-
egy to recover electoral support for the SPD
and to produce a renaissance of social
democracy in Germany?
First, the SPD’s decline from a large to a
mid-sized party is part of the broader trans-
formation of the German party system,
which started out in the late 1950s as a two-
party system in which a third, small party
(the liberal FDP) often held the balance of
power between the centre-left SPD and the
centre-right CDU/CSU. In the 1980s, the
Greens emerged, initially as a leftist alterna-
tive to the SPD, while the FDP turned to the
right. This produced the two-camp and four-
party political system of red–green (SPD and
Greens) versus the bourgeois centre-right
(CDU/CSU and FDP). The 1990s added the
post-communist East German PDS, as the
furthest left party, to what then became a
ﬁve-party system. Since 2013, the AfD has
emerged as a strong sixth party located to
the right of the CDU/CSU, and has mobi-
lised against Angela Merkel’s decision, in the
second half of 2015, to open Germany’s bor-
ders to refugees and migrants.
Summing up the transformation of the
German party system, it has turned from a
two-party system to a ﬂuid four-, ﬁve- or
six-party system (the liberal FDP and the
Left Party have sometimes failed to gain par-
liamentary representation in certain regions).
Moreover, the decline of the SPD produced
for some years, until 2015, a ‘multiparty sys-
tem with a predominant party’ (namely the
CDU/CSU), while the recent major electoral
losses of Merkel’s Christian Democrats to the
AfD in 2016 now potentially point to a ‘mul-
tiparty system without a predominant
party’.17 Nevertheless, for many years the
decline of the two former people’s parties,
the CDU/CSU and SPD, proceeded in an
asymmetric manner: the SPD suffered a
much greater decline than the CDU/CSU
and is now a party with little more than 20
per cent of electoral support, while even
after its recent losses the CDU/CSU can still
command more than 30 per cent support.
Overall, the rise of the AfD indicates a sig-
niﬁcant shift to the right in Germany’s politi-
cal balance of forces. This is all the more
signiﬁcant due to the AfD’s ability to gather
electoral support from all sides of the party
spectrum, including blue-collar workers, the
unemployed and former non-voters (many
of them in turn former SPD voters). In this
context, it is often claimed that former sup-
porters of the left now drifting to the AfD
are voting ‘against their own interests’.
While this is to some extent true, given that
the AfD has a strong market-radical wing
238 J €OR G M I C H A E L DO S T A L
The Political Quarterly, Vol. 88, No. 2 © The Author 2016. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2016
demanding cuts in social spending and
deregulation, one must also acknowledge
that the SPD has deeply alienated voters
from disadvantaged milieus by completely
disregarding their socio-economic interests
and blaming them for their failure to suc-
cessfully adapt to market-driven modernisa-
tion. Thus, many former SPD voters might
believe that voting for the AfD is the best
way to, in turn, show their own disregard
for the ‘new’ SPD.
This raises the second issue of how the
SPD, Left Party and Greens might success-
fully form a centre-left alliance, and perhaps
even a future government, in the context of
a transformed German party system that
now also includes the rightist AfD. Here it
has frequently been argued that the SPD’s
turn to embrace many features of neoliberal-
ism is simply too far advanced to be
reversed. In the same context, observers have
suggested that the Left Party might now
qualify as a kind of ersatz SPD, representing
blue-collar workers and the disadvantaged
milieus that have been lost by the SPD,
while the Greens might appeal to a centrist
faction of the middle class. Overall, it is
argued that the future of the centre-left
might be a division of labour: the SPD
marches in the middle while the Left and the
Greens form wing parties.
This ‘convoy strategy’ suffers from serious
shortcomings, however. The Left Party has
in practice failed to gain stable access to
blue-collar voters and disadvantaged groups.
Most of the voters who moved in 2009 from
the SPD to the Left Party have drifted away
again, either to non-voting or, more recently,
to the AfD. Furthermore, the Left Party has
been unable to improve the social positions
of its core constituency: past coalition gov-
ernments of the SPD and Left Party in Ger-
many’s eastern regions did not resist the
structural pressures of neoliberal capitalism.
In the case of the SPD and Left Party gov-
ernment in Berlin between 2001 and 2011,
for example, the Left Party was involved in
the privatisation of around 200,000 housing
units and agreed to deregulate employment
contracts in the public sector. The Left Party
then lost around half of its vote share in
2011—a striking parallel with the earlier
experiences of the SPD.18 Thus, the Left
Party shares the SPD’s difﬁculty in
mobilising potentially progressive voters
from disadvantaged groups. The ersatz SPD
is always in danger of being too close to the
original and must make efforts to retain its
independent proﬁle in order to be able to
engage in social mobilisation.
By contrast, the Greens are today a party
of the bourgeois centre rather than a stable
component of the left political camp. In prin-
ciple, the Greens can form coalition govern-
ments with both the centre-left and the
centre-right. It is therefore not possible for
the SPD or Left Party to rely on the Greens
to engage in a division of labour. Overall,
the prospects for a ‘convoy strategy’ of the
left thus look rather bleak. In fact, the share
of Germany’s left vote has fallen in the early
twenty-ﬁrst century, and there currently
exists little societal inclination to turn to a
red–red–green ‘convoy’ for an alternative
political course.
Last, one must not overlook what is
patiently obvious: the centre-left SPD will
not be able to recover politically without
credible offers to socially disadvantaged
groups. The SPD’s turn, since 2003, to the
centre and neoliberalism has backﬁred in the
German context, in which the proportional
electoral system allows voters more choice
than is the case under the Westminster
model. Neither disadvantaged groups nor
blue-collar voters will vote for the SPD, or
even the Left Party, if these parties fail to
accommodate their social interests, especially
meaningful social protection and redistribu-
tive policies. Such a turn back to one’s own
former voters is of course not going to make
social democracy recover overnight. Yet
without such turn, the crisis of the SPD will
only deepen further, and the idea of a renais-
sance of social democracy will remain uto-
pian.
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